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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Andrew Hubbard appeals from the judgment entered upon his
guilty plea to failure to register as a sex offender.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
After being convicted in California of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a
child under fourteen, Hubbard became subject to sex offender registration
requirements.

(PSI, pp.5-7); see I.C. § 18-8307.

In April 2011, Hubbard

absconded from his California parole and traveled to Idaho. (PSI, p.9.) In June
2011, California authorities informed Idaho authorities about Hubbard's active
felony warrant and possible presence in Idaho. (PSI, p.2.) Idaho police officers
located and arrested Hubbard. (Id.) A record check revealed that Hubbard had
not complied with the sex offender registration requirement in Idaho. (Id.)
The state charged Hubbard with failure to register as a sex offender. (R.,
pp.18-19.) Hubbard pied guilty. (R., pp.26-33; Tr., p.11, L.3 - p.17, L.13.) The
district court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with five years fixed, to run
consecutive to any other sentence Hubbard was currently serving. (R., pp.3841.)

The court later denied Hubbard's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of

sentence.

(R., pp.45-49.)

Hubbard timely appealed from the judgment of

conviction. (R., pp.50-52.)
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ISSUES
Hubbard states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court violated Mr. Hubbard's right to be
free from double jeopardy when it imposed a sentence in
this case premised on the belief that California had been too
lenient in its initial sentencing on the underlying offense.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by focusing
intently and almost exclusively on Mr. Hubbard's other
offenses for which he had already been punished instead of
the facts of the charge at issue when it imposed a sentence
in the case before it.

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to
redline the unreliable and erroneous statements regarding
Mr. Hubbard's criminal history from the PSI.

(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did Hubbard fail to preserve his claim that the district court's sentence is
illegal?

2.

Has Hubbard failed to show the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

3.

Has Hubbard failed to preserve his claim that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to redline certain portions of his PSI?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Hubbard Failed To Preserve His Claim That The District Court's Sentence Is
Illegal
A.

Introduction
Hubbard contends the district court violated his double jeopardy rights by

imposing a sentence in his failure to register case that essentially punished him
for his prior lewd conduct charge for which he had already been sentenced.
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) Hubbard's claim fails because he failed to preserve
his argument that the district court imposed an illegal sentence.

Further,

Hubbard has failed to establish fundamental error.

B.

Hubbard Failed To Preserve His Illegal Sentence Claim
The double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and Idaho

Constitutions protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
multiple punishments for the same offense.

State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368,

370, 256 P.3d 776, 778 (2011 ). Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows the trial court to
correct an illegal sentence at any time, on the motion of either party, and either
party may appeal from the trial court's ruling.

I.C.R. 35; State v. Hernandez,

122 Idaho 227, 229, 832 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct. App. 1992). A double jeopardy
claim asserting that a court imposed multiple punishments for the same offense
clearly presents a challenge to the legality of a particular sentence which may
be addressed pursuant to I.C.R. 35. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745, 69
P.3d 153, 165 (Ct. App. 2003) ("An illegal sentence ... is one in excess of a
3

statutory provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law."); State v. Pratt, 125
Idaho 546, 553-560, 873 P.2d 800, 807-815 (1993) (double jeopardy claim
analyzed pursuant to Pratt's I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence
presented to the district court); State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941,944 n.2, 71 P.3d
1088, 1091 n.2 (Ct. App. 2003) (a double jeopardy challenge may be raised "by
a motion under I.C.R. 35 to correct an illegal sentence."). Further, a claim of an
illegal sentence may not be raised for the first time on appeal without the trial
court having first had an opportunity to consider the legality of the terms of the
sentence. State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 845, 828 P.2d 871, 874 (1992) (court
declined to consider claim of illegal sentence because defendant presented it for
first time on

appeal,

notwithstanding the fact that the record clearly

demonstrated that sentence was illegal); State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578-79,
808 P.2d 1322, 1323-24 (1991); State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662, 889 P.2d
93, 96 (Ct. App. 1995); Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 229, 832 P.2d at 1164.
While Hubbard filed an I.C.R. 35 motion in this case, he did so only on
the grounds of leniency. (R., pp.37, 45-49.) Because Hubbard did not raise the
legality of his sentence by a way of an I.C.R. 35 motion below, thereby depriving
the district court of the opportunity to correct any alleged error, Hubbard failed to
preserve the issue for appellate review, and this Court must decline to address it
absent a showing of fundamental error. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245
P.3d 961, 978 (2010) (re-articulating Idaho fundamental error review standard.)
In this case however, no fundamental error review is necessary because
the policies implicated by the fundamental error doctrine are simply not present.
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Most trial errors must be objected to before the district court and raised on direct
appeal or a criminal defendant forfeits his opportunity to challenge the alleged
error.

The doctrine of fundamental error affords a defendant the right to

appellate review that would otherwise not exist. However, I.C.R. 35 specifically
provides an avenue for pursuing relief from an allegedly illegal sentence at any
time, so if this Court declined to consider the issue, Hubbard would not be
precluded from having his double jeopardy claim considered by the district court.
Consistent with these policies, Idaho appellate courts have declined to perform
fundamental error analysis where a defendant raises an illegal sentence claim
for the first time on appeal. Lavy, 121 Idaho at 845, 828 P.2d at 874; Martin,
119 Idaho at 578-79, 808 P.2d at 1323-24; Dorsey, 126 Idaho at 662, 889 P.2d
at 96; Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 229; 832 P.2d at 1164. The district court must
be given an opportunity to correct its errors, after which Hubbard may appeal if
he is not satisfied with the district court's decision.
Hubbard appears to acknowledge that pre-Perry, he would have been
required to raise his illegal sentence claim to the district court before raising it on
appeal.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7, n.1.)

Hubbard recognizes that in State v.

Lee, Docket No. 30542, 2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 534, (Idaho App. July 7,
2005), the Idaho Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, considered an
issue very similar to that raised in the present case. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8,
n.1.)

Citing the availability of relief pursuant to I.C.R. 35, the Court declined to

review Lee's unpreserved multiple punishment double jeopardy claim.

Lee,

2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 534, pp.2-4. However, Hubbard correctly notes
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2005 Unpublished Opinion No. 534, pp.2-4. However, Hubbard correctly notes
that Lee does not constitute controlling precedent, and asserts that because Lee
pre-dated Perry, the issue needs to be reconsidered utilizing the Idaho Supreme
Court's new articulation of the fundamental error review standard. (Appellant's
brief, pp.6-8, fn.1.)
Perry, however, merely articulated a new standard with which to analyze
fundamental error claims, it did not re-define the concept of fundamental error
itself. In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court sought to remedy confusion caused by
"[m]ultiple statements of law pertaining to the fundamental error doctrine."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 219-200, 245 P.3d at 971-972.

Perry did not grant

defendants a new right to choose to bring their illegal sentence claims, which
were not raised below and could still be raised pursuant to an I.C.R. 35 motion,
for the first time on appeal.
Because Hubbard failed to raise his double jeopardy claim below, and
could still raise it as an illegal sentence claim pursuant to I.C.R. 35, this Court
must decline to consider this issue for the first time on appeal.

C.

Even If This Court Analyzes Hubbard's Claim For Fundamental Error.
Hubbard Has Failed To Establish Such Error
Where a defendant does not object to the alleged error below, he has the

burden of demonstrating fundamental error in order to obtain relief. Perry. 150
Idaho at 219-226, 245 P.3d at 971-978. Should this Court analyze Hubbard's
illegal sentence claim under the standard articulated in Perry, Hubbard must
demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
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constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) demonstrate that
the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it
must have affected the outcome of the trial." lg_,_ at 226-228, 245 P.3d at 978980.

Hubbard cannot meet his burden of showing either that his unwaived

constitutional rights were violated, or that any such error plainly exists from the
information contained in the appellate record. Therefore, Hubbard has failed to
meet the first and second prongs of the Perry fundamental error test.
First, Hubbard has failed to show that his unwaived constitutional rights
were violated, or that his claim even implicates double jeopardy. Hubbard does
not assert that the district court expressly imposed an additional punishment for
his prior California conviction for which he had already been sentenced.
Instead, Hubbard contends that the district court violated his double jeopardy
rights by "essentially" punishing him for his prior crime by considering
California's lenient prior sentence in its own sentencing analysis, and by
focusing too heavily on Hubbard's underlying sex offense in sentencing him in
the new failure to register case.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) While a district

court may abuse its discretion by focusing too heavily on a prior conviction in
imposing a sentence on a new crime, State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229,
984 P.2d 716, 717 (Ct. App. 1999), Hubbard has cited no case standing for the
proposition that a sentencing court can violate a defendant's constitutional
double jeopardy rights in this manner. Hubbard has therefore failed to show that
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his claim implicates double jeopardy protections.
Second, even if Hubbard could show that a sentencing court can violate a
defendant's double jeopardy rights either by considering a prior court's lenient
sentence or by focusing too heavily on conduct for which the defendant had
already been sentenced, he cannot demonstrate any such error plainly existed
in this case. At the sentencing hearing, it was Hubbard's counsel who brought
up the issue of Hubbard's California lewd conduct conviction, and that
conviction's relationship to the district court's sentencing decision on the new
failure to register charge. Hubbard's counsel asserted that Hubbard would be
extradited back to California, where he faced potential parole revocation and the
likelihood of several years incarceration on the underlying sex offense.

(Tr.,

p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.24.) It would be "unfair" to the Idaho taxpayers, Hubbard's
counsel continued, for Hubbard to be imprisoned in Idaho in light of these
pending criminal consequences in California.

(Id.)

Hubbard's counsel asked

the district court to "let California handle this." (Tr., p.26, Ls.19-24.) Essentially,
Hubbard's counsel was asking the court to impose a more lenient sentence as a
result of his California lewd conduct conviction, and his pending criminal
consequences in that case.
The district court rejected Hubbard's argument.

In so doing, the court

appropriately considered Hubbard's failure to register as a sex offender, his prior
criminal history, and his ongoing danger to the community:
And there are consequences. In our society one of the only
ways we feel comfortable having people like yourself out in the
community is if they register so that everybody is on notice that
they need to keep their children and their young girls away from
8

you.
In this case I want to remind you that - you have a fairly
significant criminal history. You have DUls, infliction of corporal
injury on your spouse or co-habitant including multiple times,
battery. And in this case you - in 2002 you were charged with four
counts of L&L. Four. You pied to two. They gave you five years
probation. This is the reason that I don't really listen to [Hubbard's
counsel's] argument.
I recognize what I'm going to do is going to cost the
taxpayers here, but I suspect that the taxpayer would just as soon
as pay the cost to make sure that you're locked up and not trust
California to do what it's supposed to do. You have four L&L's,
you pied to two, and they put you on five years probation. You
were only on probation a short period of time when they had to
revoke it. They then put you in prison. Then they put you back
out.
(Tr., p.30, L.5 - p.31, L.4.)
Later, in response to Hubbard's comment to the presentence investigator
that Hubbard was "shocked" that the state was recommending a ten year unified
sentence (PSI, p.14), the district court reiterated, "[t]he failure to register [as a
sex offender] is significant. As I told you, it's so that we make sure that people
like you, other people are aware of." (Tr., p.32, Ls.7-19.)
The district court did not punish Hubbard for his prior crimes for which he
had already been sentenced, it rejected Hubbard's counsel's argument that the
district court should impose a lesser sentence because of potential (though not
necessarily inevitable)1, future criminal consequences in California. The district
court was appropriately concerned with Hubbard's criminal history and the
protection of the community. It did not expressly or otherwise indicate an intent

1

The presentence investigator noted that Hubbard's assumption that he would
be extradited to California to face prison time was not verified by any California
authority at the time of the PSI report. (PSI, p.15.)
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Hubbard may not rely on his own interpretations of the motives behind the
court's sentencing analysis to demonstrate plain constitutional error. Hubbard
has therefore failed to meet his burden to show plain error from the information
available in the appellate record.
Because Hubbard has failed to meet the first and second prongs of the
Perry fundamental error analysis, he has failed to establish fundamental error.
This Court must therefore affirm the district court's sentence.

II.
Hubbard Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Hubbard contends that the district court abused its discretion by "focusing

intently and almost exclusively" on Hubbard's lewd conduct conviction for which
he had already been sentenced.

(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.)

However, a

review of the context of the district court's sentencing in this case reveals that
while the sentencing court considered Hubbard's prior conduct, it did so properly
in the context of considering Hubbard's ongoing danger to the community.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397,401 (2007); State v. Toohill, 103, Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982).
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C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Sentencing Discretion
It is well established that a sentencing court may properly consider a wide

range of information in determining an appropriate sentence for a defendant.
State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229, 984 P.2d 716, 717 (Ct. App. 1999)
(citations omitted). Thus, it is entirely appropriate for the sentencing court to
consider a spectrum of evidence bearing upon the defendant's character,
including the defendant's history of criminal offenses other than the one for
which he appears at sentencing.

kl

However, a sentencing court may not go

"beyond this authority and essentially impos[e] sentence for offenses other than
the one that was before the court."

kl

In Findeisen, Findeisen was caught in the process of shoplifting from a
Fred Meyer store and was charged and ultimately convicted of burglary. k!,. at
228-229, 984 P.2d at 716-717. Several weeks after the incident, Findeisen went
to the residence of the loss prevention officer who testified against him at the
burglary preliminary hearing and attacked him with pepper spray.
984 P.2d at 717.

kl

at 229,

Several weeks after that, Findeisen returned to the loss

prevention officer's residence and, while brandishing a shotgun and two
handguns, forced the loss prevention officer to the floor, handcuffed him, ducttaped his mouth, and shot him fourteen times with a pellet gun.

kl

Findeisen

was convicted of kidnapping, intimidating a witness, and aggravated battery. Id.
Findeisen was sentenced first on these three charges. Id.
When Findeisen was later sentenced for the burglary charge in front of a
different judge, the district court noted that the burglary, standing alone, was "a
11

relatively minor" and "fairly low-level" offense . .!slat 229-230, 984 P.2d at 717The district court described the attack on the loss prevention officer,

718.

however, as "a grievous wrong," and "one of the more appalling offenses that I
have seen in over 15 years of being a judge." .!sl The court imposed the
maximum ten year sentence for burglary, which it ran consecutive to the
charges in the other case.

&

In vacating Findeisen's burglary sentence, The Idaho Court of Appeals
held that the "intensity of the trial court's focus on the other offenses," for which
Findeisen had already been sentenced, constituted an abuse of discretion . .!sl
The Court also noted that the prosecutor focused almost exclusively on the
other offenses in his sentencing argument.

!fl.

While Hubbard attempts to compare his sentence with the vacated
sentence in Findeisen (Appellant's brief, pp.12-15), the cases are easily
distinguishable. Rather than downplay the significance of the case in front of it,
the district court in the present case twice referenced the importance of the
sexual offender registration requirement and its impact on the protection of
society.

(Tr., p.30, Ls.5-1 O; p.32, Ls.14-19.)

While the district court did

reference the leniency of California's sentence for the underlying lewd and
lascivious conduct conviction, it did so, as discussed above, in response to
Hubbard's argument that it should impose a lesser sentence in light of potential
future consequences in California for absconding on his parole there. (Tr., p.25,
L.23 - p.27, L.6; p.30, L.5 - p.31, L.4.) Further, while the prosecutor referenced
Hubbard's criminal history, including his lewd and lascivious conduct conviction,

12

he also discussed Hubbard's ongoing risk to the community, lack of amenability
to community supervision, and failure to register as a sex offender in Idaho.
(Tr., p.22, L.1 - p.25, L.2.)
While a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender is unavoidably
intertwined with its underlying sex offense 2 in terms of a district court's
sentencing analysis and application of the appropriate sentencing factors, the
district court in this case simply did not discuss or analyze Hubbard's California
lewd and lascivious conviction with the same intensity and exclusivity with which
the district court in Findeisen discussed the cases associated with the attacks
on the loss prevention officer.

Instead, the district court's consideration of

Hubbard's past conduct was necessary for it to determine, in light of Hubbard's
failure to keep authorities properly notified of his whereabouts, the risk Hubbard
posed to society and his potential for rehabilitation. It therefore did not abuse its
sentencing discretion.
Other factors in the district court's sentencing analysis further support the
sentence imposed.

The district court was appropriately concerned with

Hubbard's prior criminal history. (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-19.) Hubbard was required to
register as a sex offender because of his conviction for conducting a lewd and
lascivious act upon his 12-year old stepdaughter. (PSI, pp.4-7, 57-76.) Several
other lewd and lascivious charges were dismissed.

2

(PSI, pp.3-7.)

Hubbard

In fact, this relationship between a conviction for failure to register as a sex
offender and a prior conviction for the underlying sex offense is addressed in
I.C. § 18-8311, the failure to register penalty statute. Idaho Code § 18-8311 (1)
requires a sentencing court to revoke a defendant's current probation or parole,
and to run the sentence for failure to register consecutively to the offender's
underlying sex offense sentence.
13

violated his probation by using methamphetamine and marijuana, and was
eventually terminated from a sex offender treatment program. (PSI, pp.4-7, 1723.) Hubbard returned to prison for a time, but eventually was released again
on parole. (PSI, pp.4-7.) Hubbard absconded from this parole when he traveled
to Idaho.

(PSI, pp.2-7.) Additionally, Hubbard has been the subject of three

domestic violence investigations, with have resulted in two domestic violence
charges and one conviction.

(PSI, pp.3-6, 24-56.) While in prison, Hubbard

was disciplined for "mutual combat [and] posession [sic] of inmate manufactured
alcohol." (PSI, p.5.)
The district court properly considered Hubbard's prior record and the
appropriate sentencing factors in sentencing him.

Hubbard has thus failed to

show that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 10-year unified
sentence with five years fixed upon his guilty plea to failure to register as a sex
offender.

111.
Hubbard Has Failed To Preserve His Claim That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Failing To Redline Certain Portions Of His PSI
A.

Introduction
Hubbard contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to

redline certain portions of his PSI. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Hubbard has
failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
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B.

Hubbard's Argument That The District Court Should Have Amended His
PSI Is Not Preserved For Appeal
As discussed above, "[i]t is a fundamental tenant of appellate law that a

proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is
preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct.
App. 2000). Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho
at 227, 245 P.3d at 979.
The prior record section of Hubbard's presentence investigation report
depicts entries for lewd and lascivious conduct in both 2002 and 2005. (PSI,
pp.3-4.)

The section entitled "Investigator's Comments and Analysis of

Defendant's Condition" states that "[i]n 2002 and 2005, Mr. Hubbard was
convicted of Lewd Conduct with children." (PSI, p.14.) However, in the prior
record comments section, the PSI clarifies that Hubbard was convicted of lewd
conduct in 2002, and that his probation was revoked and his sentence imposed
on the same charge in 2005. (PSI, pp.5-7.) Thus, the 2005 entry in the prior
record section did not depict a new conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct.
In order to further clarify and correct this ambiguity, Hubbard submitted
information regarding Hubbard's criminal history to the court, along with other
requested PSI corrections. (PSI, pp.228-229; Tr., p.20, Ls.6-21.)

The district

court issued a "Sealed Order Correcting Information in Presentence Report,"
with Hubbard's corrections, and added it to the PSI. (PSI, pp.228-229.) At the
sentencing hearing, in response to Hubbard's reference to his requested PSI
corrections, the court stated, "Right. And I signed that and made that part of it."
15

(Tr., p.20, Ls.20-21.)

Several weeks later, the presentence investigator

submitted an addendum to the PSI which stated, "Appended is an Order
Correcting Information in PSI. Corrections were made in PSI module. This is
file information." (PSI, pp.230-233.)
On appeal, Hubbard contends that the district court abused its discretion
by merely attaching the corrections to the PSI, and not also "redlining" the
clarifications and corrections in the body of the PSI itself.

(Appellant's brief,

pp.15-17.) Hubbard, however, has failed to preserve any claim that the district
court's manner of amending the PSI constituted an abuse of discretion. At the
sentencing hearing, the court informed Hubbard that it signed his list of
corrections and added them to the PSI. (Tr., p.20, Ls.14-22.) Hubbard thanked
the court and made no further objection to the contents of the PSI. (Tr., p.20,
L.14 - p.21, L.15.) Further, Hubbard cannot show fundamental error pursuant
to Perry because he has alleged no violation of his constitutional rights, nor has
he identified any constitutional right to have his PSI corrected in any particular
manner, much less a manner he did not request.
Because Hubbard failed to preserve this claim, and because he cannot
show fundamental error, this Court must decline to entertain this issue on
appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Hubbard's sentence
for failure to register as a sex offender.
DATED this 28th day of August 2012

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of August 2012, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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